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RECENT TRENDS
PAROLE REVOCATION
1

In Morrissey v. Brewer, the United States
Supreme Court held that due process requires
"a simple factual hearing" before parole can be

revoked. 2 The Court reasoned that the liberty
of a parolee, although conditional, "includes
many of the core values of unqualified liberty
and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on
the parolee and often on others." s Thus, the
Court concluded that what is required before
termination of parole is a two-stage process,
consisting of a reasonably prompt hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that the parolee has violated a condition of his parole 4 and later on, if requested by
the parolee, a full revocation hearing in front
of the parole board. 5 Minimum due process requirements were enunciated by the Court for
each stage of the process." One year later, in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli7 the Court extended the
Morrissey due process protections to revocations of probation."
Several courts have struggled with the problem of determining when a parolee has endured a "grievous loss" sufficient to trigger the
due process
requirements
of
Morrissey-Gagnon.9 In Means v. Wainwright,10 the Florida supreme court held that
1408 U.S. 471 (1972).

2 Id. at 483.
3 Id. at 482.
4 Id. at 485.
5 Id. at 487.
6 Id. at 485-89.
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
S For a general discussion of the implications of
the Morrissey-Gagnon due process doctrine see
Cohen and Tobriner, How Much Process is "Due"
Parolees and Prisoners?, 25 HAsT. L.J. 801
(1974); Fisher, Parole and Probation Revocation
Procedures After Morrissey and Gagnon, 65 J.
CRI25. L. & C. 46 (1974) ; Note, Limitations Upon
Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions of
Probation, 8 GA. L. REv. 466 (1974).
9 In addition to the cases discussed in this section see Gardner v. McCarthy, 503 F.2d 733 (9th
Cir. 1974); Williams v. United States Board of
Parole, 383 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1974) ; In re
Valrie, 12 Cal. 3d 139, 524 P.2d 812, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 340 (1974).
10o299 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1974).

the Morrissey requirements were applicable to
the revocation of an unexecuted grant of
parole. 1 The court reasoned that the "grievous
loss" suffered by the person whose parole is
revoked is no different than the "grievous
loss" suffered by the person whose unexecuted
grant of parole is rescinded. Thus, the summary recission of petitioner-Mean's parole was
held to be a violation of the due process mandate of Morrissey-Gagnon. In Snwu
v.
Britton12 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit held that it is the "execution" rather
than the "issuance" of the revocation warrant
which triggers the due process time limits for
the revocation hearing set forth in Morrissey33
The petitioner had contended that the federal
parole board's delay in affording him a revocation hearing until after the completion of his
service of an intervening state sentence constituted a violation of his right to due process.
In rejecting this claim, the court noted that the
Morrissey requirement for a parole revocation
hearing was triggered only "within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody." :4 It was determined that such custody
for the federal parolee was not effectuated
until after the parolee revocation warrant had
been actually executed. While noting the general rule that the warrant must be executed
within a reasonable time,'1 the Small court ac11 The court cited In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d 470,
503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1972), in support of its position. The Prewitt case held that,
with the exception of the preliminary hearing, the
minimum due process requirements of Morrissey
are constitutionally required for parole recission
hearings.
12500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974).
13The court rejected the following decisions
which stand for the proposition that it is the "issuance" of the revocation warrant which triggers
the due process time limits set forth in Morrissey:
Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1974); Jones v. Johnston, 368 F. Supp. 571
(D.D.C. 1974); Sutherland v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 366 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C.
1973).
'uMorrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488
(1972) (emphasis added).
15 Simon v. Moseley, 452 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.
1971).
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cepted the petitioner's incarceration in a state fore the court. 2 1 The extension of such rights
institution as good reason for the delay in such to indigents was founded on the
constitutional
execution. 6
principles of due process and equal protection 1
In Peele v. Sigler"
a seemingly conflicting that a fair adjudication of a party's claim
2
result was reached by the United States District
should not be denied on the basis of poverty. '
Court for the Eastern District of Washington. Nevertheless, the Court qualified this right toThe court held that once a revocation warrant a state-provided transcript, 23 creiting a loopis issued and lodged as a detainer, a revocation hole through which the expansion of indihearing must be granted within a reasonable
gents' rights to prior transcripts was temporar24
time in order to allow the parolee an opportu- ily blocked. In Britt v. North Carolina,
the
nity to refute the charges.' s It was reasoned Supreme Court upheld the state court's denial
that the filing of such detainer causes a prisoner
of Britt's request for a free transcript of the
to lose eligibility for many types of rehabilitamistrial for use in the second trial. This decition programs and results in many more prison sion was based on the Court's finding that alrestrictions being placed upon him. In addition, ternative means existed by which the appellant
a federal detainer might conceivably distort the could have constructed an adequate defense.
decision by state officials as to when to grant Britt constitutes the first limitation on the
25
parole from the holding institution. These re- Griffin policy toward indigents.
strictions imposed upon the prisoner were deIn light of recent decisions in state and fedtermined to constitute a sufficiently "grievous eral courts, however, it appears that the future
loss" so as to bring the Morrissey due process
of the Griffin policy is one of expansion rather
standards into play.' 9
than limitation. The oNinth Circuit ruled in
MacCollom v. United States26 that an indigent
TRANSCRIPTS FOR INDIGENTS
federal prisoner was entitled to a free tranThe rights of indigents to the basic instru- script of his criminal trial to assist him in the
ments for an adequate trial or post-trial pro- preparation of a post-conviction motion under
ceeding are now broadening in several juris- 28 U.S.C. § 2255.27 After being convicted and
dictions despite a temporary setback. When the
Supreme Court granted the indigent petitioner to 21 Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970) (right
transcripts for use in habeas corpus proceedaccess to trial transcripts for use in appellate ings); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969)
(right to transcripts for use in de novo habeas
proceedings, Griffin v. Illinois, 20 it opened the
corpus hearings); Robert v. La Vallee, 389 U.S.
doorway for additional rights of indigents be- 40 (1967)
(right to preliminary hearing records
for preparation of trial) ; Long v. District Court,
:16Accord, e.g., Small v. United States Board of 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (right to transcript
of trial
Parole, 421 F2d 1388 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. de- for use in appeal of habeas corpus proceeding).
22 The general constitutional
nied, 397 U.S. 1079 (1970); Robinson v. Wiltheory was that,
"in criminal trials a state can no
lingham, 369 F2d 688 (10th Cir. 1966).
more discrimi27.F.
nate on account of poverty than on account of reSupp. (E.D. Wash. 1974).
18 The court did not reach the issue of whether
ligion, race, or color." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
the issuance of or the execution of an arrest war- at 17 (plurality opinion of Black, J.).
'3 The caveat inserted in the Griffin majority
rant gives rise to the right to a revocation hearing
within a reasonable time. Therefore, the decision is opinion stated:
We do not hold, however, that Illinois must
not directly in conflict with Small v. Britton, 500
purchase a stenographer's transcript in every
F.2d (10th Cir. 1974). However, the Peele court's
case where a defendant cannot buy it. The Suholding that Morrissey requires a revocation hearpreme Court may find other means of affording within a reasonable time after the filing of
ing adequate and effective appellate review to
a parole detainer, would seem to be in conindigent defendants. Id at 20.
flict with the Sinall conclusion that the paro24 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
lee's incarceration in a state institution tolls the
25 See Note, Criminal Procedure-Free Trantiming requirements of Morrissey, notwithstanding
the fact that a federal parole detainer has been scripts for Indigents, 51 N.C.L. REv. 621 (1973).
See also Ross v. Moffltt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
filed against him.
26
F2d (9th Cir. 1974).
19 In so holding, the court is expressly rejecting
27 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides in pertinent part
the view of the Fifth Circuit on this issue, as stated
in Cook v. United States Attorney General, 488 that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a
F2d 667 (5th Cir. 1974).
court established by Act of Congress claiming
20 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
the right to be released upon the ground that

COMMENTS
imprisoned in 1970, MacCollom filed a motion
for a transcript in forma pauperis in 1972. The
court clerk notified him that no action would
be taken upon the request until MacCollom
filed a motion for post-conviction relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. After complying with such
notice, MacCollom was granted his request and
obtained appointed counsel. However, the
§ 2255 action was dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. The
appointed counsel argued that he could not
represent to the court the existence of any
constitutional grounds for relief without first
explaining the transcript, yet the law seemed
to require assertion of a claim prior to issuance of the transcript. Although the Supreme
Court had never reached this point, the Ninth
Circuit majority found that Griffin and its progeny mandated a finding for the indigent petitioner. Neither these cases nor the Constitution
were found to require the indigent to have a
better memory of his trial than the nonindigent
petitioner. Furthermore, the court noted that
the cost of such transcripts to the government
should not be overestimated. First, the cost of
opposing the request may exceed the cost of
preparing the trial transcript. Second, a transcript provided upon demand may reveal no
colorable ground for relief and thus dispel the
need for a § 2255 motion altogether. In furtherance of these views, the Ninth Circuit held
that the indigent federal prisoner in this situation has an unqualified right to a free trial
transcript and need not demonstrate a "particular need."
Pollard v. Kidd2 s constitutes a recent consideration of a similar point by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Pollard, an indigent state prisoner
convicted of robbery, brought a civil action
under 42 U.S.C. § 198329 alleging that the state
the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States ....
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 383 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1974).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, or any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizens of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
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trial court's denial of his request for portions
of his trial transcript was unconstitutional.
Stating that Pollard "has raised a valid constitutional claim and has made a showing of need,
however slight," the federal court determined
that due process and equal protection require
the state to provide the plaintiff with the transcript portions relevant to that claim. The
court further stated that an application of a
stringent "particular need" as set forth by a
recent Fourth Circuit case30 was not necessary
in this case. Therefore, the holding in the Pollard case is that "whenever a litigant seeks to
raise claims of a constitutional dimension
which are not patently frivolous, on collateral
review of his conviction in either a state or
federal court," 31 he will be granted access to
the portion of the transcript which can be
identified with reasonable particularity and
which have arguable relevance to the constitutional claim. No denial of such a request will
be made unless the claim is "patently frivolous" or the, portions are "absolutely irrelevant."
State courts are following this trend of expanding the Griffin policy, as demonstrated by
Blazo v. Superior Court.3 2 In this case, the
Massachusetts supreme court concluded that
the indigent state defendant is entitled to a
cost-free process for obtaining a stenographer
for a misdemeanor trial, upon a good-faith representation by counsel that the stenographer
record is necessary to insure the defendants'
rights. The reasoning this court drew from
Griffin and its progeny was that the misdemeanor defendant should not be deprived of the
stenographic facilities routinely provided for
felony defendants simply because these are
crimes of lesser grades. Fair and comparable
treatment at public expense should be provided
at all criminal levels to protect the defendants'
right of appeal. This court found that a requirement of a pre-trial demonstration of the
need for a stenographer rather than alternative
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
30 Jones v. Superintendent, 460 F.2d 150 (4th
Cir. 1972).
31383 F. Supp. at 1059.
32 _
Mass.
, 315 N.E.2d 857 (1974).
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means of recording could prove difficult and
damaging to even a misdemeanor defendant's
case.33 Thus the court holds that the determination of such need must be left to the indi-

gent's counsel, just as it would be left to a
nonindigent's counsel. Any objection the court
may have to the delay or expense necessitated
by the request will be considered in an informal hearing. At the conclusion of this Griffin-

oriented decision, the Massachusetts court, unlike

the

federal

courts,

recognizes

the

limitation of Britt. It recognizes the shortage
of competent stenographers and the possible

expense of providing transcripts. Alternative
methods of recording are suggested as a general solution for the future. Nevertheless, the
course offered for the present coincides with

the concept of Griffin that indigents must be
treated in a manner equivalent to that of nonindigents before the court.
IMPEACHMENT OF DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY
Significant exceptions to the Mapp and Miranda exclusionary rules were enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in Walder v.
85
United States" and Harris v. New York.
Two lower court decisions have attempted to
clarify the scope of this Walder-Harrisexception, as it relates to the use of illegally seized
evidence for impeachment purposes.3 6
3

3 See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498

(1963).

34 347 U.S. 62 (1954). In Wader, a defendant
charged with possession of narcotic drugs testified
on both direct and cross-examination that he had
never possessed or sold narcotics. The trial court
permitted the prosecution to present, in rebuttal,
evidence of a heroin capsule, which had been unlawfully seized from the defendant's home. The
jury was charged that the heroin was admitted
solely for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility. The Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court decision and held that the illegallyseized evidence could properly be used as the basis
for impeachment of a defendant's testimony on
"collateral matters."
35 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris, the defendant had made a statement which was inadmissible
under the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). During the trial, the defendant
took the stand and made statements on direct examination which contradicted the prior inadmissible statement The Supreme Court held that the
prosecution could use the defendant's prior inadmissible statement to impeach the defendant's testimony on direct, where the proper jury admonition
had been given.
36 For a general discussion of the implication of
the Walder and Harris decisions see Comment,

In United States v. Tweed.7 the defendant
was charged with the illegal possession of destructive devices. At trial, he testified on both
direct and cross examination that he was not
in possession of any dynamite on the occasion
in question. The trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce expert testimony indicating that the defendant's clothing, which had
been unlawfully seized, contained traces of certain chemicals found in ammonia dynamite.
The jury was admonished that this evidence
could only be considered in passing on the defendant's credibility and could not be considered as evidence of guilt. On appeal, the defendant argued that it was error for the trial
court to have admitted the rebuttal evidence.
In affirming the defendant's conviction, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the illegally-seized evidence was properly
admissible for impeachment purposes, notwithstanding the fact that it was used to impeach
testimony relating directly to the crime
charged. The court noted that Harris had
eliminated any distinction between impeachment as to collateral matters and impeachment
as to testimony bearing more directly on the
crimes charged. Further, the fact that the prosecution's evidence was circumstantial in character did not vitiate its admissibility as impeaching evidence.
In People v. Sturgis s the Illinois supreme
court was faced with the issue of whether reversible error occurred when the trial court allowed the prosecution to use for impeachment
purposes certain statements sworn to and
signed by the defendant in his motion to suppress. At trial, the defendant had denied, on
cross examination, that the police had taken
any physical evidence from him. The prosecution challenged the credibility of this testimony
by noting the variance of the addresses where
the arrest was said to have been made and the
allegation in the suppression motion relating to
the seizure of physical evidence. The trial
court permitted this line of questioning over
The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 73 COLUm. L. REv. 1476 (1973); Note, Impeachinent by Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence-The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule, 34
OHIO STATE L.J. 706 (1973).
Z 503 F2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974).
38 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E. 2d 545 (1974).

COMMENTS
defendant's objections, and admitted the motion
into evidence for impeachment purposes. Relying principally upon Simmons v. United
States"9 and Brown v. United States40 the defendant argued that it was reversible error for
the trial judge to permit a damaging admission
necessary to raise a fourth amendment claim to
be used against him at the subsequent trial.
In rejecting defendant's contention, the court
stated that the Simmons-Brown doctrine must
be read in harmony with the Harris admonition that, "[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse
to do so. But that privilege cannot be con3S390 U.S. 377 (1968). The court forbade the
use at trial of a defendant's inculpatory testimony
given in support of a motion to suppress the evidence.
40411 U.S. 223 (1973). The Court interpreted
Simmons to prohibit the direct admission at trial
of an accused's testimony given during a suppression hearing in order to establish standing to raise
a fourth amendment claim.
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strued to include the right to commit
perjury." 41 Thus, the use of the suppression
motion to impeach the defendant was viewed
by the Sturgis court as merely an effectuation
of the Walder-Harris impeachment exceptions
to the exclusionary rule.
Sturgis is an important case for three reasons: (1) it extends the Walder-Harrisrationale to cover the use, for impeachment purposes,
of a defendant's testimony in support of his motion to suppress evidence; (2) it permits such
impeachment as to testimony relating to collateral matters, as well as testimony relating to
matters more directly bearing upon the crimes
charged; and (3) it finds impeaching evidence
as to defendant's testimony on cross-examination, as well as direct examination, to be within
the scope of admissible rebuttal evidence. 42
41

Harris v. Ne. York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).

42 Contra, People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 501

P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1972).

